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Perry and Schleifer: Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Me

attempts to anticipate the patterns of
future strategic history will be more
right than wrong.
STEPHEN B. SMITH

University of Reading
United Kingdom

Schleifer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and
Military Strategies. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic, 2006. 272pp. $69.50

In the wake of the second Palestinian
intifada against Israel (2002 through
2006), it has been easy to lose sight of
the fact that the first intifada (December 1987 through October 1991) was
largely nonviolent but highly successful.
It achieved the primary goal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO)—forcing Israel to recognize the
PLO by initiating negotiations. In this
work Ron Schleifer offers a unique,
though logically flawed, perspective of
the first intifada, which he describes as
“political warfare.” That is, he examines
how the PLO assumed control of what
began as a spontaneous nonviolent uprising in December 1987 to produce a
successful campaign that was based on a
range of largely persuasive techniques
and lasted more than three years.
Schleifer analyzes the successful Palestinian tactics and compares them to the
unsuccessful Israeli response through
the components of “psychological operations” (PSYOP) as presented in the
U.S. Army Manual of Psychological
Warfare.
Schleifer’s book is based on research
gathered for his doctoral dissertation
completed at the University of Leeds.
He chose the PSYOP manual and its
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taxonomy as his theoretical basis, and
he is at his best when using the components of the PSYOP manual to analyze
and compare how both sides prepared
their campaigns, determined and applied consistent themes or messages,
chose and used dissemination techniques and tactics, responded to enemy
messages, and applied countermeasures. He offers convincing evidence
that within the first few weeks of the
uprising, the PLO seized and maintained the initiative and dominated
what we now call “the information environment,” while the Israelis, riven by
internal ambiguity and dissent,
floundered.
Unfortunately, this work is ultimately
unsatisfying, because its organization
and thesis have logical flaws. Readers
interested in a more concise, better organized analysis of nonviolent conflict
based on psychological operations can
find it in Schleifer’s 2006 article “Psychological Operations: A New Variation
of an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” published in Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, volume 29, pp. 1–19. For
readers interested in the specific tactics
used in the first intifada, this book will
serve as a high-quality resource. This
work has several critical shortcomings,
one of them its title. A better title might
have focused on the key concept and
not the methods. Second, although he
thoroughly reviews how “propaganda”
and “psychological operations” acquired their negative connotations before and after World War II, Schleifer
applies only a restrictive definition of
PSYOP. The PSYOP manual, however,
uses a different primary definition and
categorizes different types. He analyzes
a complete taxonomy in terms of his
own different, limited, definition.
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Third, although his basic premise is that
the Palestinians were conducting “political warfare,” he only briefly discusses
the concept and does not apply all the
elements of his definition to the intifada. Schleifer asserts that the term, invented by the British to replace
“propaganda,” encompasses a broader
range of strategies, everything from
nonviolent propaganda and civil disobedience to violent terrorism and insurgency. He claims that the primary
commonality of these strategies (to replace or complement conventional warfare) is sufficient for a theoretical
analysis of the intifada. But he excludes
violent action (terrorism and insurgency, as practiced primarily by Islamic
Jihad and Hezbollah) from his analysis
of how the Palestinians conducted political warfare. Examining only a few
categories of political warfare appears
to undermine his theory.
In sum, Schleifer has written an interesting study of how the PLO and its
partners used a variety of nonviolent
persuasive tactics to achieve a significant short-term political goal. Future
study should define “political warfare”
more precisely and examine how and
why this term substantively differs from
civil disobedience, nonviolent conflict,
low-intensity conflict, propaganda, and
psychological operations, and whether
it offers a significant new perspective.
ROBERT L. PERRY

Naval War College
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“Stop, before you hurt yourself! Why?
Because I said so”—a common diktat
from a caring parent to child, about setting limits on behavior. The historical
role of grown-ups has been to nurture,
protect, and teach fledglings about
self-destructive behavior. So how, then,
is raising children the unifying theme of
a book about the decline of Western
civilization?
The answer, as Diana West argues convincingly, is a direct correlation between decades of moribund moral
norms, owing to vanishing societal maturity, and America’s inability to grasp
the seriousness of emerging global dangers. Like a child that keeps playing, unwilling to obey the call for bedtime,
America is simply not paying attention
to a world of growing challenges. Worse
yet, the author contends, there are no
adults around to take away the toys.
Of course West, an esteemed syndicated
columnist and writer, is not the first to
observe the decline of adult influence or
the erosion of individual responsibility,
nor is she original in excoriating society
and lamenting the erosion of the nuclear family. Nonetheless, West’s meticulous assemblage of tangible evidence,
superb research, insightful analysis, and
application of theory to national security issues make this book
extraordinary.
According to West, the gradual “death
of the grown-up” began not with the
revolutionary 1960s but rather directly
following World War II. Business visionaries saw the exploding generation
of youth as future consumers with unparalleled financial potential. Throughout the 1950s the magic of the
anti-adult was personified, according to
West, by the likes of music’s Elvis Presley, fiction’s Holden Caulfield, and
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